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DEVELOPMENTS IN REGULATION: ADJUSTMENT CLAUSES
By JOHN A. CARVER, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
Utility regulation is an arcane process which depends for its
effective functioning more upon a large measure of public confi-
dence in process and personnel than upon its intrinsic merit. Un-
fortunately, as the ingredient of confidence erodes among con-
sumers, investors, legislators, the academic community, the
media, and other segments of both the regulatory and regulated
community, mechanisms which trigger recurrent and seemingly
automatic rate increases come under special attack. Adjustment
clauses are in this category.
Adjustment clauses have been known since 19171 and are
currently in use in some form in most of the states They are a
regulatory device to adjust rates for cost changes without all of
the procedures used for traditional rate cases. In economic terms,
they are a form of "indexation" designed to counter the effects
of inflation.
The full range of adjustments which qualify for analysis and
discussion is large. Generally, this paper is concerned with rate
adjustments authorized to become effective pursuant to the
terms of an antecedent tariff. Some of these rate adjustments are
"automatic"; others are subject to or require hearings, notice,
audit, or other regulatory action which is definitionally short of
* Professor of Law and Director, Natural Resources Program, University of Denver,
College of Law.
I Trigg, Escalator Clauses in Public Utility Rate Schedules, 106 U. PENN. L. REv. 964
(1958). The Colorado Public Utilities Commission has stated that such clauses were ap-
proved as early as 1923. In re Public Serv. Co., 13 P.U.R.4th 1, 6 (Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1975).
' Since most of the attention of legislatures and utility regulatory agencies has been
directed to the workings of adjustment clauses for the electric and gas utilities, particu-
larly the former, most of the data on the use of such clauses are on such utilities. State-
by-state analyses have been compiled in this area. NATIONAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH Asso-
CIATES, INC., THE FUEL ADJUSTMENT CLAUSE: A SURVEY OF CRITICISMS, JUSTIFICATIONS AND
ITS APPLICATION IN THE VARIOUS JURISDICTIONS (1975), reprinted as STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON
OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE,
94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON ELECTRIC UTILITY AUTOMATIC FUEL ADJUSTMENT CLAUSES,
App. 1 (Comm. Print 1975); CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, FUEL ADJUSTMENT CLAUSE
ACTIONS IN THE ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILITY INDUSTRIES, 1973-74: A STATE-BY-STATE STATISTI-
CAL ANALYSIS (1975), reprinted in 121 CONG. REc. S4963-67 (daily ed., Mar. 24, 1975).
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that required in a full rate proceeding. The adjustments are de-
pendent upon variables such as fuel costs and taxes. Some adjust-
ments are called "tracking" or "pass-through" adjustments be-
cause the variable component is itself controlled by regulation, as
where changes are tied to rates fixed by the same or another
regulatory body. Rate adjustments may be tied to various general
price indices,' to return on equity,' to taxes,5 and to the capital
costs associated only with particular facilities such as environ-
mental facilities. 6
Terminology should be viewed with suspicion, particularly
the use of the term "automatic." Courts and commissions in the
past have sometimes called all adjustment clauses "escalator
clauses." The term "escalator clause" is more apt for incremental
price increases7 at regular or fixed intervals. A true adjustment
clause is designed to work both upward and downward as the base
factor to which it is tied moves up or down.
In the main, the discussion in this paper is confined to
adjustments in rates for the so-called fixed utilities, i.e., electric,
gas, water, and combinations thereof, and it covers both federal
and state action, wholesale and retail applications, and related
rate design implications. Outside the scope of this paper are
clauses which enable the downward adjustment of rates in order
to meet competition,8 and fuel clauses negotiated by municipali-
ties in states not having a regulatory commission.'
A number of measures at the federal level have been pursued,
3 The New Jersey Board of Public Utility Commissioners allowed a telephone com-
pany an annual adjustment to the cost of salaries and wages determined by the national
guideline increase of 6.2% less productivity increase of 4.0% or 2.2%. In re Adjustment
Clause in Tel. Rate Schedules, 3 P.U.R.4th 298 (N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm'rs 1973).
In re Public Serv. Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 113 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975).
In re Consumers Power Co., 83 P.U.R.3d 188 (Mich. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1970); In
re Alabama Power Co., 83 P.U.R.3d 321 (Ala. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1969).
' See In re Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 6 P.U.R.4th 520 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1974).
' Cf. Foy, Cost Adjustment in Utility Rate Schedules, 13 VAND. L. RLv. 663 (1960).
For a recent example, see In re Commonwealth Water Co., 7 P.U.R.4th 456 (N.J. Bd. of
Pub. Util. Comm'rs 1974), wherein the New Jersey Board of Public Utility Commissioners
rejected a proposed adjustment clause which provided for a 3.2% annual increase in rates
for water service.
Trigg, supra note 1, at 978 n.79. These were in limited use when gas utilities sought
to protect their business from unregulated competition.
I Id. at 987.
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and a legislative definition for "automatic adjustment clauses"
has been proposed. 0 The attention given to electric utility fuel
adjustment clauses by the House of Representatives Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Subcommittee on Over-
sight and Investigations," highlights the fact that adjustment
clauses are being characterized by ratepayers, and by some legis-
lators and regulatory commissions, as faulty policy and contrary
to the public interest, and as a means of permitting "over-
charges" by utilities. Speaking specifically of fuel adjustment
clauses, the Moss Subcommittee's Report is flatly condemnatory:
Automatic fuel adjustment clauses, regardless of design, are inher-
ently flawed and anti-consumer because of their tendency to seri-
ously undermine the incentive of utilities to minimize fuel costs."
The subject has been considered by other committees of the Con-
gress, including the Joint Economic Committee, 3 and the Senate
Committee on Government Operations under the continuing
leadership of Senator Metcalf.
In the states, the activity concerning such clauses is princi-
pally reflected in the rate cases decided by the state commis-
sions, 4 but there has also been legislative reaction responsive to
criticisms of the workings of the adjustment clauses. 5 The Na-
0- H.R. 12461, § 203(b)(3)(A), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), defines an adjustment
clause as:
[Tihat part, if any, of a rate schedule for the sale of electric energy which
provides for automatic adjustment of a rate to reflect a change in whole or
in part of the fuel component (including applicable taxes, tariffs, or similar
charges) per-kilowatt-hour of the cost of providing electric services.
STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS OF THE House COMM. ON INTER-
STATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESs., REPORT ON ELECTRIC UTILITY AUTO-
MATIc FuEL ADJUSTMENT CLAUSES (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as Moss COMM.
REPORT (because the subcommittee was under the chairmanship of Representative John
E. Moss, Democrat-California)]; Electric Utility Problems: Fuel Adjustment Clauses,
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the House Comm. on
Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Seas., ser. 19 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Moss Comm. Hearings].
"Moss COMM. REPORT 3, Finding No. 4.
IS Gasoline Distribution, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Economics of
the Joint Economic Comm., 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
" See note 2 supra.
" This action has ranged from outright prohibition to procedural controls. See Moss
COMM. REPORT 45 (NERA study), reporting that West Virginia has required hearings on
each adjustment, and Moss COMM. REPORT 1 n.3, noting that North Carolina abolished
fuel clauses as of September 1, 1975.
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tional Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
(NARUC) has supported adjustment clauses tied to fuel costs,
but opposed any mandatory federal legislation which would limit
individual state determinations in one direction or the other.'" A
study by a NARUC committee recommended that NARUC pre-
pare a model fuel clause. 7 Criticism of fuel adjustment clauses
has been intense in consumer circles'8 and consumer organiza-
tions presented much of the testimony considered by the Moss
Committee.'" There are inconsistencies in the remedies proposed
by critics of the regulation process. For example, the proposed
Energy Independence Act would have required state utility regu-
latory agencies to permit fuel adjustment clauses;10 other mea-
sures considered by the 94th Congress would limit or prohibit fuel
adjustment clauses.2'
Another complication presented to those responsible for re-
conciling the competing pressures is the activity of the Federal
Power Commission, which is sometimes thought to "lead" the
state commissions. The Federal Power Commission has taken a
conservative position, adopting a rule on fuel cost adjustments for
electric utilities which calls for a single base cost for fuel, 22 and
also permits only the inclusion of the charge for energy and not
other charges associated with purchased fuel costs. It requires the
filing of fuel purchase contracts as tariffs subject to suspension,
unless the particular fuel is under general price regulation. How-
ever, taxes associated with fuel cost increases are permitted to be
included, and the Commission mandates that adjustments for
" Moss Comm. Hearings 3-32 (Testimony of Ralph H. Wickberg, President,
NARUC).
'" SUBCOMM. OF STAFF ExPERTs ON ECONOMICS, NARUC, ECONOMIC PAPER No. 1R,
reprinted in Moss COMM. REPORT, App. C.
" See, e.g., The Fuel Adjustment Caper, 39 CONSUMER REPORTS 837 (Nov. 1974).
" Among the identified organizations were Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Envi-
ronmental Action Foundation, Toward Utility Rate Normalization (TURN), and East
Tennessee Research Corp. Moss Comm. Hearings, Index at iii-v.
2 H.R. 2633 and S. 534, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Title VII (1975).
" See particularly H.R. 12461, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), known as the "Electric
Utility Rate Reform and Regulatory Improvement Act." Section 203 thereof would limit
the kinds of adjustment clauses which could be approved by state agencies; section 305
similarly would control the Federal Power Commission.




fuel cost increases be spread among users on a consumption basis,
that is per kilowatt-hour of energy.
The Commission in its notice of proposed rulemaking ex-
pressed its philosophy:
We recognize the need for a fuel adjustment clause. Properly admin-
istered fuel clauses can accomplish legitimate public interest objec-
tives. Fuel clauses serve as a cost of service type mechanism to pass
through changes in actual, reasonably and prudently incurred costs
of fuel (decreases as well as increases), ensure appropriate and
timely cash flow to electric utilities by eliminating "regulatory lag",
and reduce regulatory expense, administrative processing costs and
the number of formal rate proceedings. These features of the fuel
clause inure to the benefit not only of the public utility but also the
customer and taxpaying public. However, improperly administered
or inadequately regulated by governmental authority, fuel clauses
can be inequitable and unfair.n
The legal and economic literature is generally sympathetic to
adjustment clauses. John W. Kendrick, has concluded that com-
munications utilities can properly utilize adjustment clauses:
The public utilities generally have productivity performance records
of which they can be proud. Hyperinflation threatens productivity
advance through profit erosion. Automatic cost adjustments seem to
be the answer, but only if combined with efficiency incentives which
will motivate utility managements to continue to achieve at least as
good a record of productivity advances in the future as in the past.2'
I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Foy 5 and Trigg 6 have documented regulatory commission
consideration of adjustment clauses from about 1917. Disap-
proval of requested clauses has usually been for the asserted rea-
son that the adjustment clause technique is incompatible with
the spirit and purpose of regulatory law and confusing to the
consumer.
27
The most significant recent development is the decision by
the New Mexico Public Service Commission to allow an adjust-
' 40 Fed. Reg. 26702, 26705 (1975).
2 Kendrick, Efficiency Incentives and Cost Factors in Public Utility Automatic Rev-
enue Adjustment Clauses, 6 BELL J. OF ECON. 299, 312 (1975).
* Supra note 7.
* Supra note 1.
* In re Union Elec. Co., 92 P.U.R.3d 254 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1971); In re Public
Serv. Co., 95 P.U.R.3d 401 (N.H. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1972).
1976
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
ment in rates based upon the utility's return on equity falling
above or below a range of 13.5% to 14.5% in the preceding annual
period.2
In Texas, where utilities are not yet generally under state-
wide commission regulation, the city of Houston has agreed that
Houston Lighting & Power should have a "cost-of-service adjust-
ment clause" that will lead to increases in rates whenever the
costs of labor (excluding executive salaries), depreciation and the
interest requirement of bonds go up faster than revenues.29
Illinois Bell submitted an adjustment clause which, although
it was rejected by the Illinois Commerce Commission, 0 reflects a
recognition of the interrelationship between cost increases and
productivity increases. As proposed, the clause would assign
weights to changes in both costs and productivity to keep the
company reasonably whole at the rate of return level authorized
by the commission.
A different twist in the recent developments concerning ad-
justment clauses is presented in the rejection by an FPC adminis-
trative law judge of a proposal by United Gas Pipe Line which
would allow its purchased gas tracking adjustment tariff to reflect
declining sales volumes.' There is now pending before the Fed-
eral Power Commission a proposed rule to deal with purchased
gas cost adjustments. It would limit the number of purchased gas
adjustments to two a year, prescribe the semi-annual adjustment
dates, and would cover both pipeline and producer supplier
costs.32
Schiffel concludes that the use of automatic fuel rate adjust-
ments "is a useful regulatory tool that has probably not been
abused," but, reflecting the more conservative of the views of
generally approving commentators, he thinks the "extension of
such clauses to costs over which the company has some control
and which are relatively stable would appear to be inappropriate
as well as unnecessary. 
'33
In re Public Serv. Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 113 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975).
As reported in ELECTRICAL WEEK, Apr. 19, 1976, at 1.
In re Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 9 P.U.R.4th 638 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1975).
3, FPC Docket No. RP74-21 (Initial Opinion of Aug. 19, 1974).
" FPC Docket No. R-406 (May 10, 1976), 41 Fed. Reg. 20177 (1976).
Schiffel, Electric Utility Regulation: An Overview of Fuel Adjustment Clauses, 95
PuB. UTIL. FORT. 23 (June 19, 1975). See generally Browne, The Frustration of a Fuel
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II. THE LEGAL BASES OF ADJUSTMENT CLAUSES
One theory supporting adjustment clauses is that the rate
adjustment when made has already been subjected to appropri-
ate procedural and substantive requisites. An adjustment clause
enables the utility to recover its costs more rapidly than under
orthodox rate proceedings but not to increase its rates above al-
lowable costs. Adjustment clauses also save the regulatory agency
from becoming bogged down with rate cases. The legal standards
of regulation remain unchanged. The regulatory agency defini-
tionally is without lawful power to turn its regulatory responsibil-
ity over to the company, so when a rate is increased "automati-
cally," the theory is that the company is acting pursuant to a
tariff which has been fully considered.
A utility is constitutionally entitled to have the opportunity
to recover the costs of rendering service to the public, and such
costs include a fair rate of return on the rate base. The "prud-
ence" of the costs incurred is subject to regulatory supervision.
Consequently, an adjustment clause usually takes the form of a
fixed rule, determined to be just and reasonable in the underlying
rate proceeding, accompanied, at least by implication, with the
finding that it does not become less so by reason of its provision
for subsequent changes in rates, upward or downward, based
upon the occurrence of future events. 34 In a word, adjustment
clauses are not per se illegal.3 Some state cases have involved the
issue of compliance with statutory requirements, but few of the
illegality contentions have been sustained.38
Clause, 92 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 30 (Aug. 16, 1973). See also Jones & Winston, Automatic
Adjustment Clauses-Saints or Sinners?, ABA PuB. UTtL. LAW SECTION ANNUAL REPORT 3
(1975); Sarikas, What is New in Adjustment Clauses, 95 PuB. UTIL. FORT. 32 (June 19,
1975).
" North Carolina ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Edmisten, 27 N.C. App. 171, 217 S.E.2d
201 (1975); City of Norfolk v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 197 Va. 505, 90 S.E.2d 140
(1955). The Virginia court's language has been frequently cited:
The proposed escalator clause is nothing more or less than a fixed rule
under which future rates to be charged the public are determined. It is
simply an addition of a mathematical formula to the filed schedules of the
Company under which the rates and charges fluctuate as the wholesale cost
of gas to the Company fluctuates. Hence, the resulting rates under the esca-
lator clause are as firmly fixed as if they were stated in terms of money.
197 Va. at 516, 90 S.E.2d at 148.
" See Maestas v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 85 N.M. 571, 514 P.2d 847 (1973).
31 E.g., Consumers Organization for Fair Energy Equality, Inc. v. Department of Pub.
1976
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In some states, all adjustment clauses are prohibited.37 Thus
far no state seems to have mandated them. Between these ex-
tremes, the state laws on the subject vary in their requirements
on shortened proceedings before an adjustment clause-triggered
increase in rates may become effective. Notice, and the filing of
specified information, may be mandated.
Adjustment clauses which take effect without some hearing
procedure, however shortened, are not for that reason freed from
continuing regulatory supervision. Complaint procedures are
almost universally available to challenge the rates of a utility
which do not conform to the standard of being just and reasona-
ble.39 In addition, the audit and inspection function of the regula-
tory agency may be directed particularly to the workings of ad-
justment clauses by explicit provisions in the order approving the
rule.
The more complex the factors prescribed to trigger rate ad-
justments, the more complex becomes the task of regulatory sur-
veillance. But even the very simple fuel adjustment or "pass-
through" situations can present legal questions. One recent ex-
ample of this involved an adjustment in rates based upon an
increase in the price of Canadian gas carried by Pacific Gas
Transmission Co. (PGT) to its parent, Pacific Gas & Electric
(PG&E). The Federal Power Commission had approved a tariff
under which fluctuations of the price of Canadian gas, as fixed
by Canadian regulatory authority, would be reflected in the
monthly billing arrangement between the transmission company
and the customer utility, without prior Commission approval.'0
In a proceeding which arose out of a filing of a new contract
between PGT and a Canadian affiliate, the Federal Power Com-
mission instituted proceedings to determine whether PGT's tariff
Util., 335 N.E.2d 341 (Mass. 1975). See note 33 supra. But note the pendency of State ex
rel. Florida Power Corp. v. Pfeiffer, Civil No. 46,384.
37 See note 2 supra.
" Moss Comm. Hearings 92; Schiffel, supra note 33, at 27.
" In Pacific Gas Transmission Co. v. FPC, 536 F.2d 393 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the use of section 5(a) com-
plaint authority to require that before increasing its wholesale rates as authorized by an
approved tariff, the company must file an application and seek approval under section 4,




should be modified to redefine the elements includible on pur-
chased gas costs in PGT's rates, and therafter required that prior
filings be made with the Federal Power Commission before any
increases in the cost of Canadian gas could be passed on to the
U.S. purchaser.
The Commission's position was upheld by the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit in an opinion written
by retired Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark." Justice Clark
said that any other procedure would make the Federal Power
Commission a rubber stamp for Canadian authority, since such
action would subject gas consumers "to unjust and unreasonable
rates fixed by the Canadian authority ipse dixit."''
Since neither the Commission nor the Court of Appeals can
control Canadian governmental authority which sets gas rates at
the border, only the existence of cheaper domestic alternatives to
supply the particular market should justify denying entry of the
gas. Judge Bazelon, not always sympathetic to natural gas sup-
pliers complaining about FPC regulation,' 3 suggested that the
FPC might have conditioned its original grant of import author-
ity, rather than amending the particular tariff in a procedure he
called "peculiar." His comment on the majority's reasoning is
cogent:
The fatal flaw in this reasoning is that it falsely assumes the
tariff somehow disabled the Commission from responding to Cana-
dian imposed price increases. In truth, the only measure the tariff
precluded the FPC from taking was that the FPC could not tempo-
rarily or permanently prohibit PGT from recovering costs incurred
because of the increases. The Commission has failed to explain why
imposing a prohibition on cost recovery ever would be an appropri-
ate or even plausible response to Canadian price increases. After all,
PGT, not the Canadian government or Canadian producers, would
bear the brunt of such a prohibition; the FPC concedes that had
PGT been required to absorb even the initial 32 cent price increase
for a short period of time it would have been driven out of business,
and 2,000,000 consumers would have been deprived of 40% of their
gas supply. Yet PGT plainly has no responsibility for or control over
41 Id.
11 Id. at 396.
41 Id. at 397 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). Judge Bazelon began his dissent in this case
by saying, "There is a certain attractiveness, I must admit, to the FPC's decision in this
case . . .
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price increases mandated by the national Canadian government.
PGT cannot even mitigate the impact of those increases by expand-
ing production of non-Canadian gas since PGT's sole operations are
in Canada. Thus, the Commission could not possibly question the
reasonableness of PGT recovering costs imposed upon it by the Ca-
nadian government. This would be true even if those costs were
unreasonable-a question the Commission expressly declined to
consider. The Commission's actions in promptly approving all the
increases PGT has requested since its tariff was modified strongly
support this conclusion."
In another case involving the passthrough of Canadian gas
costs, the Montana Supreme Court sustained a 1972 Montana
Public Service Commission approval of a rate order containing a
purchased gas adjustment clause which authorized the company
to increase or decrease its charges, subject to commission review
on a periodic basis. The commission held a hearing limited to the
issue of the cost of Canadian gas in 1973 and allowed the pass-
through. In 1974, however, the Montana Consumer Counsel
sought to have the hearing expanded to cover all items of the cost
of service. The Montana Supreme Court, reversing a district
court ruling requiring the expanded hearing, said:
Consumer Counsel contends that the Commission is without
power and jurisdiction to issue the 1974 rate order on the basis of a
so-called "mini hearing" . . . . The substance of his argument...
is that the Commission is without power to approve a utility rate
increase without conducting a full scale hearing and examination of
all factors that affect a fair rate of return for the Company.
Here the Company did not apply for an increased rate of
return .... Instead, the Company's application simply sought to
maintain this rate of return ... by "passing through" to its custom-
ers the tremendous increases in the costs of purchased gas and roy-
alty expense. Under such circumstances, the rate of return and an-
nual net earnings were not germane to the Company's application,
and a full scale hearing into factors affecting the rate of return and
general rate structure of the Company was beyond the scope of the
inquiry before the Commission.
In our view the underlying justification for the use of "auto-
matic adjustment clauses" and procedures lies in the realities of the
market place. As the cost of purchased gas and royalty expense of
the utility rise or fall, a corresponding increase or decrease in the
Id. at 397-98 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
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prices charged its customers must occur. Otherwise the utility will
either be driven out of business or it will reap windfall profits.
Today, in a period of rapid increases in costs of these items to the
utility, the former consideration is paramount; at another time, the
situation may be reversed and the latter may be the principal con-
cern. Automatic adjustment clauses and procedures are simply a
means whereby rapid fluctuations in these costs to the utility can
be reflected in equally rapid and corresponding changes in prices
charged the utility's customers.'"
Matters other than the recovery of costs are properly consid-
ered by commissions and courts, even in adjustment clause situa-
tions. For example, the Federal Power Commission, while consid-
ering a proposed rate increase for resale customers, determined
that it lacked authority to take into account the fact that state
regulation of the resale customer prevented it from recovering its
added wholesale costs. This exposed the customer to a "price
squeeze" in having to pay more at wholesale than he could charge
his own retail customers. This holding was reversed by the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the United States
Supreme Court affirmed." While adjustment clauses were not
involved in that case, the situation could arise under their
application.47
After a regulatory commission has agreed that it is in the
public interest to adjust rates to track certain classes of costs
more rapidly than would be possible by full rate case procedures,
is it logical for the commission to limit the recovery of costs to a
specified percentage increment? The Michigan Public Service
Commission limited a fuel adjustment clause to no more than
90% of the experienced cost increase;' 8 an equivalent provision is
contained in the proposed "Electric Utility Rate Reform and Reg-
ulatory Improvement Act." 41 Such provisions postulate a duty on
the part of the investors to bear a percentage of the burden of
attrition.
It has been suggested that adjustment clauses are a part of
a natural progression in the move from rate hearings, to ratemak-
, Montana Consumer Counsel v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 541 P.2d 770, 773-75 (1975).
" FPC v. Conway Corp., 510 F.2d 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1975), a/i'd, 96 S. Ct. 1999 (1976).
,7 Moss Comm. Hearings 644-47 (Testimony of Gordon W. Hoyt).
' In re Consumers Power Co., 14 P.U.R.4th 370 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976).
, See note 21 supra.
1976
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ing through rulemaking procedures, to regulation by formula. 0
When the rate of return was deemed a stable item in the ratemak-
ing formula, inflationary and deflationary pressures were sought
to be accommodated in the rate base valuation process. "Trend-
ing" of rate base valuations was never automatic, and generally
was not judicially validated, but the objectives sought to be ac-
complished were the same as those sought in adjustment clauses.
The ratemaking process long tended to be less rather than
more formulary. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Company" repre-
sented very nearly the outer limits of departure from formulas.
The ability of the regulatory commissions to frame their decisions
to avoid judicial interference with their policymaking preroga-
tives has been severely challenged by shortage allocation and
environmental issues. Hearings, particularly full-scale hearings,
have become tools capable of being manipulated by the compet-
ing forces with commissions being caught in the middle. The
poignant discussion by the New Mexico Commission of the "tyr-
anny of the rate case" is illustrative:
The essential situation . . . is that traditional, adversary, formal
service rate proceedings, which are occurring with ever increasing
frequency and urgency, are simply proving both inadequate to the
task and too time and energy consuming. In short, this commission
and its staff are subject to the tyranny of continuous rate cases, and
our other regulatory responsibilities are neglected in the conse-
quence .... As mentioned earlier, service costs have become a
moving target which scarcely holds still long enough to be quanti-
fied, with the result that even the most painstaking determination
of an energy utility's test-year costs, annualized and adjusted to
current levels, and service rates fixed at levels to cover such costs,
often prove woefully inadequate by the time the rates become effec-
tive. All too often during the past several years, newly authorized
service rates have failed to cover the energy utility's rapidly increas-
ing total costs of service, with the result that, while its operation,
maintenance, tax, depreciation and amortization costs may be cov-
ered, its capital costs are not, even though the service rates were
carefully designed to do so. When the earnings stability and reliabil-
Schiffel, supra note 33.
" Before the virtually universal acceptance of original cost valuation, utility commis-
sions struggled with the application of trending and indexation techniques. Cf. West v.
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662 (1935).
- 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
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ity of an energy utility are reduced, the market responds by increas-
ing its costs of capital and the customer inevitably suffers. 53
Legislative consideration of such problems, undoubtedly in-
fluenced by the volume and intensity of consumer complaints
about rate increases, seems to be devoted much more to the hear-
ing process and its length than to the substantive issue of attri-
tion and how to meet it. The right of a utility to file for an increase
deemed necessary for its continuance of adequate service to the
public is an essential substantive due process aspect of utility
regulatory methodology.54 Thus, legislative proposals to forbid
"pancaked" rate filings, the filing of a second, third, or fourth
rate case while earlier ones are still not finally determined,'5 is
likely to present important issues for courts to resolve.
5
III. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
The conventional wisdom that regulation results in lower
rates has been academically 7 and politically 8 challenged. So has
the conventional wisdom that low rates are preferable to high
rates in all circumstances. The comments of William W. Lindsay,
now Associate Chief of Economics at the Federal Power Commis-
sion, are apt on the latter point:
What has perhaps not been so widely recognized is the fact that
regulatory lag also interferes with the ability of rates to perform
In re Public Serv. Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 113, 120-21 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975).
Particularly is this true where, as is usually the situation, the regulatory commis-
sion can suspend a rate filing for no more than a specified number of months. Although
rates thereafter collected are subject to refund, the company has the cash flow necessary
to keep it in operation, if its contentions turn out to be wholly or partially correct.
35 H.R. 12461, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 304 (1976).
" Such provisions could revive the Ben Avon Doctrine, Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben
Avon Bureau, 253 U.S. 287 (1920), that a claim of confiscation requires a fair opportunity
for submitting that issue to a judicial tribunal for independent determination of both law
and facts.
11 DeAlessi, An Economic Analysis of Government Ownership and Regulation:
Theory and Evidence from the Electric Power Industry, 19 PUB. CHOICE 1 (1974); Stigler
& Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5 J. LAw & ECON.
1(1962).
S COUNCIL OF ECONoMic ADVISERS, 1975 ECONoMic REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT. Chapter
5 addresses "Government Regulation," and contains these comments:
This discussion of governmental regulation suggests that existing laws and
institutions are imposing significant costs on the economy. . . . Precise esti-
mates of the total costs of regulation are not available, but existing evidence
suggests that this may range up to 1 percent of gross national product. ...
Id. at 159.
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another of their principal functions-that of demand control. Recent
proposals to revise traditional electric rate structures, whether or not
one happens to believe they are misguided, have served to empha-
size the proposition that the amount of electricity taken is affected
by the price charged. Since the amount of resources allocated to the
production and distribution of electricity depends on the demand for
the service and the latter depends on the level and structure of rates,
resources will be misallocated to the extent that rates fail to reflect
costs. In this sense, among others, prices which do not reflect costs
are not in the public interest."
Much of the legal framework within which the economy of
the United States operates is predicated on the assumption of
reasonable price stability in the general price level,1o and reminds
us that "indexation" might well be a cure as well as a palliative
for inflation, citing Friedman's argument that by reducing the
windfall gains to government and other groups (in this case, pre-
sumably, ratepayers) and by more promptly transmitting disin-
flationary tendencies throughout the economy, these clauses may
serve a basic economic objective beyond that of either the rate-
payers or the investors."'
5, Moss Comm. REPORT 122 (footnote omitted).
Kendrick, supra note 24, at 299. This may be an appropriate place to note that the
assumption of price stability was central to the thinking of Justices Brandeis and Holmes
in their concurrence in Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276 (1923) and thus contributed mightily to the adoption of the original
cost methodology for valuation of rate base. Justice Brandeis said, dissenting from the
opinion but concurring in the judgment:
Engineers testifying in recent rate cases have assumed that there will
be a new plateau of prices .... The course of prices for the last 112 years
indicates, on the contrary, that there may be a practically continuous decline
for nearly a generation; that the present price level may fall to that of 1914
within a decade; and that, later, it may fall much lower.
Id. at 303 n.16.
Query: Would we now be utilizing fair value rather than original cost methodology
to keep pace with inflationary pressures if Justice Brandeis had more clearly forseen the
future? Future query: Are we approaching the more prescient suggestion of Professor A.
J. G. Priest who said:
The Brandeis technique for determining a public utility's rate base can
remain simple even under conditions of inflation if an appropriate factor is
developed for expressing high-value dollars in terms of dollars which have
lost much of their purchasing power. Tailor-made price indices accurately
and honestly predicated on a utility's experience have provided such a solu-
tion in a number of instances. The use of general price indices in such
circumstances has been condemned, but specific indices which are generally
applicable to the property examined plainly are less subject to criticism.
Priest, Major Public Utility Decisions in Perspective, 46 VA. L. Rxv. 1327, 1334-35 (1960).
"1 Kendrick, supra note 24, at 300.
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Any study of adjustment clauses must begin with the ques-
tion of their role in combatting or contributing to inflation. It was
the supposed contribution to inflation which most preoccupied
the Moss Subcommittee. One of its "findings" was that "auto-
matic fuel adjustment clauses have accounted for nearly two-
thirds of the $8 billion increase in the price of electricity in
1974." This is a misleading statement. The differential, if any,
between the actually experienced increased costs of furnishing
electric service, and the rates charged to recover these costs, is a
valid inquiry, but using an adjustment clause does not itself es-
tablish the existence of a differential.
The New Mexico Public Service Commission's experiment
has intriguing economic, legal, and administrative consequences.
The commission's adjustment clause is tied to return on the eq-
uity of the common stockholders. 3 The commission did not agree
that this amounted to a guaranty of investor profit or that it
contributed to inflationary pressures. With an elliptical, but dis-
cernible reference to the Stiglerian hypothesis that regulation
does not really affect prices very much, the commission said:
The cost or rate of return a public utility must pay or be able to pay
in order to obtain common equity funds from the private capital
markets is set for the company by the market, not by this commis-
sion or the company.'
The commission was orthodox in its conclusion that the cost of
common equity capital is simply another cost of furnishing serv-
ice not generically different from any of its other costs."5
Any adjustment clause case must begin by determining the
base rates against which the adjustments should apply. The New
Mexico Commission tempered the effect of its adjustment clause
by differentially scaling downward the base levels below the rates
being collected under bond,"6 so that the company was allowed to
raise the rates for its large use customers proportionately less
" Moss COMM. REPORT 2.
* In re Public Serv. Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 113, 124-25 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975).
It is noteworthy that a proposed rulemaking of the Federal Power Commission adopts the
same general range of "return on equity" as an appropriate method of determining rates.
FPC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking RM77-1 (Oct. 15, 1976), 41 Fed. Reg. 46618 (1976).
11 In re Public Serv. Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 113, 126 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975).
,5 Id.
" The schedule is as follows:
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than its smaller use and residential customers, presumably be-
cause the former could be expected to bear the heaviest burden
of the future effects of the adjustment clause, applied by a speci-
fied per kilowatt hour amount. The right to stay any requested
adjustment, pending a hearing and resolution of contested issues
was reserved; and reports of the company were required to be
available for public inspection7
One provision of the New Mexico Commission's order is con-
ceptually inconsistent. An existing monthly fuel cost adjustment
procedure was continued in effect."' Perhaps this was to maintain
separate visibility in a customer's bill for this particular item of
cost. In theory, the cost of service indexing keyed to return on
common equity obviates all other adjustment clauses.
The relationship between adjustment clauses and another
regulatory mechanism put forward to combat the effects of infla-
tion, inclusion of construction work in progress in rate base, was
also discussed by the New Mexico Commission. Construction
work in progress is financed with either debt or equity, so the
formula should not provide for the inclusion of an offsetting al-
lowance for funds during construction as a revenue item. The
company was allowed to capitalize the allowance for funds used
during construction and add it to the plant account only with
respect to non-revenue-producing investment such as environ-
Requested Allowed
Service Category Increase Increase
Residential
Overhead 13.7 c! 11.1%
Underground 19.8 17.3
Small Power 9.7 9.7
General Power 11.3 11.3
Large Power 15.5 10.3
Industrial Power 17.2 8.7
Private Area Lights 6.3 6.3
Standby Service
Irrigation 15.3 15.3
Water and Sewage 6.7 6.7
Average Increase 11.5, 9.7%
Id. at 121.
'7 Id. at 123.
' Id. at 122.
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mental equipment, and transmission, distribution, and miscella-
neous additions.6 9
On the other hand, the allowance for funds during construc-
tion which was related to investment in generating capability was
required to be included as a revenue item, and capitalized, thus
deferring recovery in rates of the cost of capital associated with
such investment until after the plant goes on line. The FPC has
changed its rules with a similar distinction being made. 0
The equivalent of the legal question of confiscation is pre-
sented in economic policy terms in the matter of dilution of stock
value, and in the matter of comparing the costs and benefits of
maintaining coverage ratios (earnings as a multiple of debt serv-
ice costs) and, ultimately, in the matter of measuring the costs
of utility bankruptcy. The latter question was emphasized in tes-
timony before the Moss Subcommittee, when a utility witness
said that in view of the increase in the delivered price of coal by
131% over a one year period, the company would have been un-
able to pay its bills when due, and would most likely have been
bankrupted, if it had not had an adjustment clause.7'
The New Mexico Commission discussed the costs of attempt-
ing to finance expansion for a company whose common stock
value is below book value:
[If a utility continually attempts to sell common stock at prices
below inevitably declining book values to raise that portion of its
new capital requirements dictated by the need to keep its debt capi-
tal ratio in reasonable balance, sophisticated investors and ulti-
mately the entire market may soon be unwilling to buy at any
price.7"
The commission also reacted favorably to testimony which quan-
tified the cost of losing a bond rating level:
Quite logically, these [rating] institutions perceive increases in
debt ratios and declines in coverage ratios as indicative of an in-
crease in risk to the investor and downrate the securities of the
public utility accordingly, with the result that the cost of new debt
and preferred stock capital to it is increased by the capital market
" Id. at 124.
70 FPC Docket No. RM75-13 (Nov. 8, 1976), 41 Fed. Reg. 51392 (1976).
71 Moss Comm. Hearings 716.
" In re Public Serv. Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 113, 128 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975).
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proportionately . . . .[Tihe current difference between the cost of
AA and A rated utility bonds and preferred stocks is 0.89 per cent.
Estimating that approximately 85 per cent of the capital necessary
to finance PNM's five-year construction budget-i.e., $625,760,000,
must be generated externally or from the private capital markets,
that 65 per cent of this amount must be raised by the sale of bonds
and preferred stock, and that the new plant in which it will be
invested will have a 30-year life, . . . retention of PNM's AA rating
would result in 30-year savings in the amount of approximately $110
million."3
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS
To obtain administrative approval, the advantages of adjust-
ment clauses must be found to outweigh the disadvantages. The
regulatory agency must be persuaded that adjustment clauses are
adequately resistant to abuses which frustrate regulatory objec-
tives. This presents various administrative problems.
The process of balancing competing interests in having or not
having a full rate case involved accepting trade offs. The expecta-
tion approaching certainty that costs will increase, not decrease,
during the period following a rate determination, has dominated
ratemaking for a number of years. Rate models which incorporate
ancitipated future changes, such as in financing, revenues, rate
base, taxes, depreciation, and operating expenses, are routine.
Rates are fixed upon a cost-of-service which may be based upon
a "forward test year.''74 The policy argument as to inclusion of
construction work in progress in the rate base is summarized in
a recent FPC order as follows:
The allowance of CWIP in the rate base involves a judgment that it
is equitable for present ratepayers to provide funds that would oth-
erwise be provided by future ratepayers. At the present time, there
is only one area where the Commission has agreed for all companies
that this outcome would be equitable. This is in the area of facilities
which are required because of the current generation's commitment
to the control of pollution, or its consumption of existing stocks of
natural resources. Thus, we will allow the inclusion of CWIP in rate
base where the construction is of facilities to be used for pollution
control, or for the conversion to the burning of other fossil fuels of
plants which now burn oil or gas. In these cases, it is the profligacy
of the present generation which requires the new facilities, and we
13 Id. at 130-31 (footnote omitted).
1, American Pub. Power Ass'n v. FPC, 522 F.2d 142 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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consider that the equitable argument favoring this allocation of
costs is sufficient to tip the balance in favor of the allowance of
CWIP on these facilities."'
In theory, at least, the nature of ratemaking precludes a
company's realized rate of return from matching that used for
ratemaking purposes except as a transient coincidence. The pres-
sures of inflation have resulted in commissions candidly allowing
rates of return higher than otherwise might have been allowed in
order that the time period between rate cases can be extended.
It may be less than fair, therefore, to make too much of the
comparison of the workings of adjustment clauses against the
alternative of full rate cases. A well-designed adjustment clause
can permit a ratemaking agency to allow a lesser revenue level
than would be the case if it did not have the adjustment clause."6
Adjustment clauses may well be more certain and more favorable
to consumers than alternative regulatory devices. Nevertheless,
the administrative problems associated with adjustment clauses
are frequently presented as if the alternative of a full hearing
procedure was a model of certainty.
In any adjustment clause situation, as in ratemaking without
such clauses, the traditional objective is to maintain sufficient
incentives for management to reduce costs by making a wise
choice among alternative generation modes, by hard bargaining
with suppliers of labor, materials, and fuel, by shrewd selection
among financing alternatives, and by alert planning and
supervision.
The psychology of utility management is not the subject of
this paper. However, there is a massive difference between the
incentive of a professional's pride in doing a good job and the
incentive of staving off bankruptcy for an extra month or so. The
regulatory agency must furnish incentives to the management of
the regulated utility. Do adjustment clauses reduce incentive?
Requiring a full rate hearing for every increase is administratively
burdensome, and the disarray among the states' attitudes about
adjustment clauses reflects to a degree differences in their views
about the tradeoff between incentive and administrative conveni-
" FPC Docket No. RM75-13 (Nov. 8, 1976), 41 Fed. Reg. 51392 (1976).
See In re Public Serv. Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 113, 137 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975).
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ence, more than it does a difference in view about the recovery of
proved costs.
The Moss Committee hearings emphasized administrative
problems, including one it called "over-collection." In an adjust-
ment clause context, this is basically not different from the cir-
cumstance that realized revenues sometimes exceed projected
revenues. This is not called over-collection. Experience usually
varies from projection and it can occur in an adjustment clause
context.
The California Public Utilities Commission split on treat-
ment of such a variation in a situation where the mix of hydro
and fossil fuel generation changed. By a 3-2 rate decision, the
commission required PG&E and Southern California Edison to
"refund" $203 million because of the "over-collections." The dis-
senting commissioners said that "while we can concur in the revi-
sion of the fuel-cost-adjustment clause from a forecast basis to a
recorded basis, we dissent when the majority decides to exceed
the law to order refunds." The company announced that the deci-
sion would be appealed."
The skewing of rate design is a more substantive matter, but
critics of this effect generally fail to realize that it works in favor
of the low load factor residential users at the expense of the high
load factor industrial and commercial customers. The characteri-
zation of this differential as a "windfall profit" seems to be highly
inappropriate."7
Another administrative problem is one discussed in connec-
tion with Philadelphia Electric Company. The company's tariff
excludes nuclear fuels from the workings of its fuel adjustment
clause. Investment per kilowatt in nuclear generation so far ex-
ceeds conventional fossil generation, that inclusion of nuclear fuel
without recognition of this fact would heavily penalize the nu-
clear utility until it can include the new investment in its rate
base.79 Fuel clauses are administratively difficult to handle where
several companies are part of an integrated system. Derivation of
a base cost for a particular company's fuel, procured from long
" Wall Street Journal, Apr. 28, 1976, at 15, col. 2.
" Moss Comm. Hearings 361.
1' Id. at 354.
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term contracts, from captive mines, and from spot purchases, is
difficult8 0 The supervision or audit of fuel purchasing practices
is relatively easy on a post hoc basis, and critics of the workings
of fuel clauses can easily insist that the company should have
operated its system differently. Therefore, requiring purchase
contracts to be submitted for review is becoming more common.8 '
Accommodating efficiency factors into adjustment clauses
was extensively discussed by the West Virginia Public Service
Commission," in considering a situation where one regulated
company used a variable efficiency factor, and another used a
fixed efficiency factor. In the former, heat rating and line loss
factors are determined each month, whereas in the latter, a fixed
line loss and constant heating rating are determined.
The list of theoretical arguments against an adjustment
clause is long. It is to be expected that to the extent adjustment
clauses withstand the current legislative attack, the design of the
clauses themselves will be influenced by the same considerations
which are urged in connection with such current social objectives
as inhibiting demand, aiding conservation, and advancing envi-
ronmental quality.m
Regulatory lag is always under attack, but the "lag factor"
is an affirmative tool of those opposed to rate increases. Compet-
ing forces might find an area of compromise by agreeing upon a
fixed delay period, or a fixed discount factor. The need to pass
costs along to the customers and the countervailing need to keep
utility management on its toes to save costs might be served in
this fashion. Some lag factor clauses are adopted on the legalistic
ground that a delay in the workings of a clause is necessary for
procedural fairness, to give those affected by the increase an op-
portunity to file complaints and trigger review procedures.
CONCLUSION
The process of ratemaking is legislative, but by tradition and
by statute it has always been required to be conducted in the full-
Id. at 730.
, Id. at 731.
A In re Investigation of Fuel Adjustment Clauses, 8 P.U.R.4th 607 (W.Va. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1975).
0 See Avery, Social and Economic Factors in Rate Design, ABA PuB. UTIL. LAW
SECTION ANNUAL REPORT 48 (1975).
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hearing format of adjudication. Roger Crampton has contributed
considerable insight in his discussion of the rapid expansion of
the use of formal evidentiary hearings in administrative decision-
making in some fields, while simultaneously such use is under
attack in other areas. His paper in the VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 4
relates primarily to the judicialization of the process of nuclear
power siting, but what he says about how we should think about
procedures is apt on the adjustment clause versus full rate hear-
ing issues. Instead of using talismanic phrases like "fairness" and
"due process," we might follow his suggestions and compare pro-
cedural alternatives in terms of whether they further the accurate
selection and determination of relevant facts and issues, further
the efficient disposition of business, and meet a standard of "ac-
ceptability" to the public.
On the test of accuracy, it seems that a well-designed adjust-
ment clause is superior to the full hearing, for the reasons articu-
lated by the New Mexico Commission. The possibility of the
traditional full hearing being more accurate than the rates re-
flecting the workings of a fully litigated rule on adjustments is
about equivalent to the comparison of a stopped clock being more
accurate than a clock running fast or slow.
As to efficiency, the same can be said. The regulatory process
has bogged down to the point of scandal, and the recommenda-
tions of the Moss Committee and others as to how to handle the
growing crisis are ludicrous. The prescription of more money and
more personnel for the regulatory process, or for the use of rules
forbidding the "pancaking" of rate cases as if the tide of cost
increases could be held back by regulatory or legislative fiat is
simply unrealistic.
However, the matter of acceptability may be the shoal upon
which not just adjustment clauses, but utility regulation as we
have known it, will founder. It is undeniable that the current of
sentiment against energy producing and energy delivering com-
panies in this country is running strong. It is unfortunate indeed
that the public is being misled into believing that somehow a cost
passed through to consumers through the workings of an adjust-
" Crampton, A Comment on Trial-Type Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58
VA. L. REv. 585 (1972).
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ment clause is not a real cost. The financial integrity of all utili-
ties is presently shaky, and public confidence is at a very low ebb.
In many ways, the utilities are victims of their own past
successes, because their achievement of economies of scale and
their technological advances for a long time cancelled out the
upward pressures of inflation. It is no longer possible to look
forward to productivity gains cancelling out the increased costs
related to inflation.
The issues are not legal ones. The applicability of an adjust-
ment clause is almost always determinable upon policy grounds
dependent upon legislative rather than adjudicative facts. There-
fore, due process in a constitutional sense does not demand the
kind of adversary hearing which the critics of these clauses seem
to assume.
Neither are the issues economic. What should be said here
is that the discipline of economics is a fertile field for further
empiric research to assist the regulatory process, particularly in
the design phase where so many of the administrative problems
have been identified.
Adjustment clauses do not deserve the criticisms which have
been leveled against them, but decrying the criticisms will have
no effect. A positive case must be made, showing that they offer
a way to maintain the values and traditions of a regulatory sys-
tem which has served the public for more than a hundred years.

